Difference between revisions of "T1 Font Integer Overflow"

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The Ndrv setspec() Integer Overflow also known as DejaVu [http://twitter.com/#!/comex/status/88208990789578752] is a vulnerability used [[Saffron]].
 
The Ndrv setspec() Integer Overflow also known as DejaVu [http://twitter.com/#!/comex/status/88208990789578752] is a vulnerability used [[Saffron]].
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== Description ==
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The pdf bug used in [[Saffron]] is like an integer checking problem. When dealing with op_callothersubr, arg_cnt is defined as an integer. arg_cnt is read from decoder->stack, which could be set to 0xfea50000 by charstring "fb ef". And this will bypass stack checking. Then "top -= arg_cnt" will make top points to data outside of decoder->stack. Actually it points to decoder->parse_callback.
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Sources:
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[http://twitter.com/#!/windknown/status/88170553948651520 1]
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[http://twitter.com/#!/windknown/status/88171950886760448 2]
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[http://twitter.com/#!/windknown/status/88172830029651968 3]
   
 
== Credit ==
 
== Credit ==

Revision as of 23:49, 6 July 2011

The Ndrv setspec() Integer Overflow also known as DejaVu [1] is a vulnerability used Saffron.

Description

The pdf bug used in Saffron is like an integer checking problem. When dealing with op_callothersubr, arg_cnt is defined as an integer. arg_cnt is read from decoder->stack, which could be set to 0xfea50000 by charstring "fb ef". And this will bypass stack checking. Then "top -= arg_cnt" will make top points to data outside of decoder->stack. Actually it points to decoder->parse_callback.

Sources: 1 2 3

Credit

comex