Difference between revisions of "T1 Font Integer Overflow"

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(Description)
(Sources)
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==Sources==
 
==Sources==
* Tweets from [https://twitter.com/windknown @windknown]: [https://twitter.com/windknown/status/88170553948651520][https://twitter.com/windknown/status/88171950886760448][https://twitter.com/windknown/status/88172830029651968]
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* Tweets from [https://twitter.com/windknown @windknown]: [https://twitter.com/windknown/status/88170553948651520][https://twitter.com/windknown/status/88171950886760448][https://twitter.com/windknown/status/88172830029651968][https://twitter.com/#!/windknown/status/88173940391940096]
 
* [http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4723 Apple KB]
 
* [http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4723 Apple KB]
 
* http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-0202
 
* http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-0202

Revision as of 23:58, 11 July 2011

The T1 Font Integer Overflow (A.K.A DejaVu as it is very similar to the Malformed CFF Vulnerability[1]) is a vulnerability used in Saffron.

Credit for Exploitation

Description

When dealing with op_callothersubr, arg_cnt is defined as an integer. arg_cnt is read from decoder‑>stack, which could be set to 0xfea50000 by charstring "fb ef". And this will bypass stack checking. Then "top ‑= arg_cnt" will make top point to data outside of decoder‑>stack. Actually it points to decoder‑>parse_callback. decoder->parse_callback address minus default address of that function to get ASLR offset. That's how it bypass ASLR.

This vulnerability was actually addressed by Apple in Template:Wp/Security Update 2011-004, but a fix was never pushed to iOS. Its CVE identifier is CVE-2011-0202.

Sources