Talk:GID Key - Revision history

IAdam1n: /* Keys */ I haz one

2014-10-15T16:59:55Z

‎Keys: I haz one

Http: /* Keys */ link update

2013-08-04T08:03:52Z

‎Keys: link update

5urd: 5urd moved page Talk:GID-key to Talk:GID Key

2013-08-03T23:35:35Z

5urd moved page Talk:GID-key to Talk:GID Key

Http: /* Keys */

2012-06-19T05:28:07Z

‎Keys

5urd: /* Keys */

2012-06-18T22:41:30Z

‎Keys

Http: /* Keys */

2012-06-18T06:54:32Z

‎Keys

5urd: /* Keys */ new section

2012-06-17T22:29:38Z

‎Keys: new section

Http: moved from NCK page (correct here?)

2012-03-12T19:44:43Z

moved from NCK page (correct here?)

Vaumnou: /* Vaumnou */ new section

2008-08-06T21:10:56Z

‎Vaumnou: new section

Geohot at 02:02, 6 August 2008

2008-08-06T02:02:59Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 16:59, 15 October 2014
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	::Is there any possible way to dump it? (Debug the decryption engine?) Or is it encrypted itself? --[[User:5urd\|5urd]] 16:41, 18 June 2012 (MDT)		::Is there any possible way to dump it? (Debug the decryption engine?) Or is it encrypted itself? --[[User:5urd\|5urd]] 16:41, 18 June 2012 (MDT)
	:::See all the comments here. Many have tried. It's in the hardware and even there protected so that you cannot simply extract it with usual techniques (x-ray etc). Best chances to get it are side-channel attacks. Maybe open the chip, attach some internal lines and run the engine with different values and see what happens with the probe. That requires enormous costs (many destroyed phones, probing hardware, etc.). There are specialized companies (Flylogic?) that tried such things already without success or nobody had the money to pay them. --[[User:Http\|http]] 23:28, 18 June 2012 (MDT)		:::See all the comments here. Many have tried. It's in the hardware and even there protected so that you cannot simply extract it with usual techniques (x-ray etc). Best chances to get it are side-channel attacks. Maybe open the chip, attach some internal lines and run the engine with different values and see what happens with the probe. That requires enormous costs (many destroyed phones, probing hardware, etc.). There are specialized companies (Flylogic?) that tried such things already without success or nobody had the money to pay them. --[[User:Http\|http]] 23:28, 18 June 2012 (MDT)
		+	::::To extend this old topic, I have an original iPhone if anyone knows how to run the AES engine for S5L8900. --[[User:IAdam1n\|iAdam1n]] ([[User talk:IAdam1n\|talk]]) 16:59, 15 October 2014 (UTC)

@@ Line 38: / Line 38: @@
 == Keys ==
 I think we should list the keys for all processors here. Anyone agree? --[[User:5urd|5urd]] 16:29, 17 June 2012 (MDT)
-:The problem is that nobody knows the [[GID-key]]. Or were you talking about the derived [[AES Keys#Key 0x837|key 0x837]]? For [[AES Keys#Key 0x837|key 0x837]] we don't need to list all, because only the S5L8900-one is useful. Is there anything else you would want to list here? --[[User:Http|http]] 00:54, 18 June 2012 (MDT)
+:The problem is that nobody knows the [[GID Key]]. Or were you talking about the derived [[AES Keys#Key 0x837|key 0x837]]? For [[AES Keys#Key 0x837|key 0x837]] we don't need to list all, because only the S5L8900-one is useful. Is there anything else you would want to list here? --[[User:Http|http]] 00:54, 18 June 2012 (MDT)
 ::Is there any possible way to dump it? (Debug the decryption engine?) Or is it encrypted itself? --[[User:5urd|5urd]] 16:41, 18 June 2012 (MDT)
 :::See all the comments here. Many have tried. It's in the hardware and even there protected so that you cannot simply extract it with usual techniques (x-ray etc). Best chances to get it are side-channel attacks. Maybe open the chip, attach some internal lines and run the engine with different values and see what happens with the probe. That requires enormous costs (many destroyed phones, probing hardware, etc.). There are specialized companies (Flylogic?) that tried such things already without success or nobody had the money to pay them. --[[User:Http|http]] 23:28, 18 June 2012 (MDT)

← Older revision		Revision as of 05:28, 19 June 2012
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	:The problem is that nobody knows the [[GID-key]]. Or were you talking about the derived [[AES Keys#Key 0x837\|key 0x837]]? For [[AES Keys#Key 0x837\|key 0x837]] we don't need to list all, because only the S5L8900-one is useful. Is there anything else you would want to list here? --[[User:Http\|http]] 00:54, 18 June 2012 (MDT)		:The problem is that nobody knows the [[GID-key]]. Or were you talking about the derived [[AES Keys#Key 0x837\|key 0x837]]? For [[AES Keys#Key 0x837\|key 0x837]] we don't need to list all, because only the S5L8900-one is useful. Is there anything else you would want to list here? --[[User:Http\|http]] 00:54, 18 June 2012 (MDT)
	::Is there any possible way to dump it? (Debug the decryption engine?) Or is it encrypted itself? --[[User:5urd\|5urd]] 16:41, 18 June 2012 (MDT)		::Is there any possible way to dump it? (Debug the decryption engine?) Or is it encrypted itself? --[[User:5urd\|5urd]] 16:41, 18 June 2012 (MDT)
		+	:::See all the comments here. Many have tried. It's in the hardware and even there protected so that you cannot simply extract it with usual techniques (x-ray etc). Best chances to get it are side-channel attacks. Maybe open the chip, attach some internal lines and run the engine with different values and see what happens with the probe. That requires enormous costs (many destroyed phones, probing hardware, etc.). There are specialized companies (Flylogic?) that tried such things already without success or nobody had the money to pay them. --[[User:Http\|http]] 23:28, 18 June 2012 (MDT)

@@ Line 37: / Line 37: @@
 == Keys ==
 I think we should list the keys for all processors here. Anyone agree? --[[User:5urd|5urd]] 16:29, 17 June 2012 (MDT)
 :The problem is that nobody knows the [[GID-key]]. Or were you talking about the derived [[AES Keys#Key 0x837|key 0x837]]? For [[AES Keys#Key 0x837|key 0x837]] we don't need to list all, because only the S5L8900-one is useful. Is there anything else you would want to list here? --[[User:Http|http]] 00:54, 18 June 2012 (MDT)

← Older revision		Revision as of 06:54, 18 June 2012
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	I think we should list the keys for all processors here. Anyone agree? --[[User:5urd\|5urd]] 16:29, 17 June 2012 (MDT)		I think we should list the keys for all processors here. Anyone agree? --[[User:5urd\|5urd]] 16:29, 17 June 2012 (MDT)
		+	:The problem is that nobody knows the [[GID-key]]. Or were you talking about the derived [[AES Keys#Key 0x837\|key 0x837]]? For [[AES Keys#Key 0x837\|key 0x837]] we don't need to list all, because only the S5L8900-one is useful. Is there anything else you would want to list here? --[[User:Http\|http]] 00:54, 18 June 2012 (MDT)

← Older revision	Revision as of 23:35, 3 August 2013
(No difference)

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:29, 17 June 2012
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	== side-channel attack ==		== side-channel attack ==
	Some super-smart guy should try that http://m.technologyreview.com/communications/39855/ --[[User:M2m\|M2m]] 09:53, 12 March 2012 (MDT)		Some super-smart guy should try that http://m.technologyreview.com/communications/39855/ --[[User:M2m\|M2m]] 09:53, 12 March 2012 (MDT)
		+
		+	== Keys ==
		+
		+	I think we should list the keys for all processors here. Anyone agree? --[[User:5urd\|5urd]] 16:29, 17 June 2012 (MDT)

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:44, 12 March 2012
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	According to [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard Wikipedia], the known timing attacks for AES are cache timing attacks. This won't work if the hardware crypto engine has one-cycle read access to its ROM, and I know of no reason why it wouldn't.		According to [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard Wikipedia], the known timing attacks for AES are cache timing attacks. This won't work if the hardware crypto engine has one-cycle read access to its ROM, and I know of no reason why it wouldn't.
		+
		+	== side-channel attack ==
		+	Some super-smart guy should try that http://m.technologyreview.com/communications/39855/ --[[User:M2m\|M2m]] 09:53, 12 March 2012 (MDT)

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:10, 6 August 2008
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	Browning out the chip is more what I was thinking. Probing the chip is far beyond my abilities, but I could brown the chip out for a clock cycle or two and determine where in the pipeline I am. I would need to know a lot more about the coprocessor design. It is standard? HDL model out there?		Browning out the chip is more what I was thinking. Probing the chip is far beyond my abilities, but I could brown the chip out for a clock cycle or two and determine where in the pipeline I am. I would need to know a lot more about the coprocessor design. It is standard? HDL model out there?
		+
		+	== Vaumnou ==
		+
		+	According to [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard Wikipedia], the known timing attacks for AES are cache timing attacks. This won't work if the hardware crypto engine has one-cycle read access to its ROM, and I know of no reason why it wouldn't.

← Older revision		Revision as of 02:02, 6 August 2008
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	this sounds like a job for leet hacking super hero TA Mobile!		this sounds like a job for leet hacking super hero TA Mobile!
		+
		+	== geohot ==
		+
		+	Hopefully the amount of time varies from encrypt to encrypt, although I believe most AES engines are fixed in time.
		+
		+	Browning out the chip is more what I was thinking. Probing the chip is far beyond my abilities, but I could brown the chip out for a clock cycle or two and determine where in the pipeline I am. I would need to know a lot more about the coprocessor design. It is standard? HDL model out there?